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Abstract
In this paper reasonable payoﬀ intervals for players in a game in parti-
tion function form (p.f.f. game) are introduced and used to deﬁne the notion
of compromisable p.f.f. game. For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compro-
mise value is deﬁned for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.
Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information
without chance moves is introduced. For this class of perfect extensive form
games there is a natural credible way to deﬁne a p.f.f. game if the players
consider cooperation. It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way
are compromisable.
1 Introduction
Games in partitionfunctionform (or p.f.f. games) are introduced in Thrall (1962),
Thrall and Lucas (1963). In the last decade these games have received an in-
creasingattention,especiallyinthe environmentalliterature(ChanderandTulkens
∗This paper was written while the second and third authors were visiting Tokyo Institute of
Technology, September-December 2002.
†Corresponding author. E-mail address: branzeir@infoiasi.ro(1997), Funakiand Yamato (1999), Pham Do (2003)) because they are suitablefor
handling externality problems in cooperative situations. Especially various cores
(Chander and Tulkens (1997), Funaki and Yamato (1999)) and Shapley values
(Bolger (1983), Pham Do and Norde (2002), Potter (2000)) have been studied.
Inspired by the literature on reasonable outcomes (cf. Milnor (1952), Gerard-
Varet and Zamir (1987), Tijs and Lipperts (1982)) and on compromise values
for TU-games (cf. Tijs (1981), Tijs and Otten (1993), van den Brink (1994),
Bergantinos and Masso (1996)) and for cooperative fuzzy games (Branzei et al.
(2002)) we introduce in Section 2 of this paper for p.f.f. games reasonable payoﬀ
intervals for players cooperating in the grand coalition and use them to deﬁne
compromisable p.f.f. games. For the subclass of compromisable p.f.f. games a
compromise value is deﬁned. Each coordinate of the compromise value lies in the
reasonable payoﬀ interval of the corresponding player.
In Section 3 of this paper a subclass of games in extensive form is considered,
where subgame perfect equilibria (Selten (1965, 1975)) play an essential role to
relate such games, when cooperation is considered,with a p.f.f. game in a natural
way. For p.f.f. games obtained in this way the compromise value exists.
Section 4 concludes with some remarks.
2 Reasonable outcomes and a compromise value for
games in p.f.f.
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of players and let Π(N) be the set of possible
partitions of N. So, each π ∈ Π(N)i so ft h ef o r m{S 1,S 2,...,S k},w h e r et h e
non-empty subcoalitions S 1,S 2,...,S k in π a r ep ai r w i s ed i s j o i n ta n dN = ∪k
r=1S r.
If π ∈ Π(N)a n dS ∈ π,t h e n( S |π) is called a π-embedded coalition.Ag a m e
 N,V  in p.f.f. assignsto each π-embeddedcoalition(S |π) a real number V(S |π).
This real number expresses the value of S given π, i.e. the amount the players in
S can obtain given that the player set N splits up according to π.I nt h ef o l l o w i n g
we suppose that












Let us denote for each i ∈ N by Πi(N)t h es e t{π ∈ Π(N)|{i}∈π}.F o r a
game  N,V  in p.f.f. we deﬁne now for each player i ∈ N the (possibly empty)
reasonable payoﬀ interval Ii = [ i,ui]a sf o l l o w s . T h elower value  i for each
i ∈ N is given by
 i = min{V({i}|π)|π ∈ Π
i(N)}
2and the upper value ui is given by
ui = V(N |{N}) −  N\{i} ,





            π ∈ Πi(N)
 
.
Note that  i is the payoﬀ g u a r a n t e e dt op l a y e ri if he stays alone; whatever the
partition of N\{i} in subcoalitions his payoﬀ is at least  i and there is a partition
of N\{i} where he does not get more. Similarly,  N\{i} is the payoﬀ guaranteed to
N\{i} if player i w a n t st os t a ya l o n e . S o ,t h em a r g i n a lc o n t r i b u t i o no f{i} to the
grand coalition is at most ui, and this is a reasonable upper bound of the payoﬀ
interval of player i.
Deﬁnition 1. Let  N,V  be a p.f.f. game and for each i ∈ N let Ii = [ i,ui]
be the corresponding reasonable payoﬀ interval for player i. Then  N,V  is a
compromisable game if
(C.1)  i ≤ ui for each i ∈ N;
(C.2)
 
i∈N  i ≤ V(N |{N}) ≤
 
i∈N ui.
Deﬁnition2. Let  N,V be a compromisable game. The compromise value ψ(N,V)
isthe convexcombinationα( 1,  2,...,  n)+(1−α)(u1,u2,...,un)o f  and u,wh ere
α is such that
 
i∈N ψi(N,V) = V(N |{N}).
Note that for a compromisable game the reasonable payoﬀintervals arenon-empty
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and the upper vector u = (u1,u2,...,un) lies ‘above’ this hyperplane. ψ(N,V)i s
the pointin the intersection H ∩ L( ,u), where L( ,u) is used for the line segment
with end points   and u.
Example 1. Let N = {1,2}.L e tV be given by
V({1}|{{1},{2}}) = 6, V({2}|{{1},{2}}) = 0, V(N |{N}) = 10.
Then [ 1,u1] = [6,10],[ 2,u2] = [0,4], and ψ(N,V) = α(6,0) + (1 − α)(10,4) =
(8,2), where α =
1
2.
L e tu sd e n o t et h es e to fc o m p r o m i s a b l en-person p.f.f. games by CPG
N.N o w
we list some properties of the compromise value on CPG
N.





i∈N ψi(N,V) = V(N |{N}) for each  N,V ∈CPG
N.
(iii) (Additive Game Property)L e ta ∈ RN and let  N,Va  be the additive game
corresponding to a ∈ RN with the property that for each π ∈ Π(N)a n d
S ∈ π: V(S |π) =
 
i∈S ai. Then  N,Va ∈CPG
N and ψ(N,Va) = a.
(iv) (Covariance Property)L e t N,V ∈CPG
N and  N,Va  be the additive game
corresponding to a ∈ RN. Then  N,V − Va ∈CPG
N and ψ(N,V − Va) =
ψ(N,V) − a.
(v) (Weak Proportionality Property)L et N,V ∈CPG
N and letthe lowervector
  of  N,V  be equal to 0 ∈ RN.T h e n ψ(N,V) is a multiple of the upper
vector u.
We leave the proofs of the properties (i) – (v) to the reader.
The following theorem shows that the properties (ii), (iv) and (v) are charac-
terizing properties for the compromise value ψ (cf. Tijs (1987)).
Theorem 1. There is a unique solution ϕ : CPG
N → RN with the properties
Eﬃciency, Covariance and Weak Proportionality, and it is the compromise value
ψ.
Proof. We know already that ψ possesses the three properties. Take ϕ : CPG
N →
RN satisfying the three properties. We have to prove that ϕ(N,V) = ψ(N,V)f o r
each  N,V ∈CPG
N.T a k e N,V ∈CPG
N.L e ta ∈ RN be the vector with ai equal
to the lower value  i for each i ∈ N.T h e nf o r N,V − Va ∈CPG
N the lower value
is 0. By the Eﬃciency Property and the Weak Proportionality Property for ψ and
ϕ we obtain
(1) ψ(N,V − Va) = ϕ(N,V − Va).
From (1) and the Covariance Property then it follows ψ(N,V) = ϕ(N,V). 
In Section 3 we consider a class of compromisable games arising from a sub-
class of extensive form games, where the players consider cooperation possibili-
ties.
43 Cooperation in perfect extensive form games
Inthissectionwepay attentiontoa generic subclassof games in extensiveformof
perfectinformationwithoutchancemoves. We adoptasmuchaspossible notation
fromSelten (1975), cf. Varoufakis(2001) andwe referalsoto thissource for back-
ground information. So, we denote such a game with player set N = {1,2,...,n}
by Γ= N,K,P,h .H e r eK is the game tree with origin or root 0. With Z we
denote the set of vertices which are end points in the tree K,a n dw i t hX we de-
note the set of other vertices. P = {X1,X2,...,Xn} is the player partition of X,
where Xi is the set of decision vertices of player i ∈ N. The payoﬀ function
is h : Z → RN and the i-th coordinate hi(z)o fh(z) is the payoﬀ resulting for
player i if the point z is reached as a result of the decisions of the players. For
each partition π = {S 1,S 2,...,S k} of Π(N) we consider the extensive form game
Γ(π) =  π,K(π),P(π),hπ  which corresponds to the situation where the player set
N splits up in cooperative player collectives S 1,S 2,...,S k who decide (jointly) in
all their decision vertices with the aim to maximize the sum of their payoﬀs.
Formally, given Γ= N,K,P,h  and π ∈ Π(N) we introduce the game in
extensive form Γ(π) =  π,K(π),P(π),hπ  as follows:
(i) The players are collectives S 1,S 2,...,S k, subsets of N,s u c ht h a t
π = {S 1,S 2,...,S k};
(ii) K(π) = K;
(iii) P(π) = {XS 1,XS2,...,XS k} is the player partition of X, where for each r ∈
{1,2,...,k}, XSr = ∪i∈SrXi;
(iv) hπ = (hπ
S 1,hπ
S 2,...,hπ




i∈S r hi(z) for each z ∈ Z.
Note that the original game Γ coincides with Γ(πd), where πd is the discrete parti-
tion of N.
Example 2. Let Γ be the (perfect) extensive form game depicted in Figure 1,
where the game tree K has origin v1 and where N = {1,2},Z = {z1,z2,z3},X =
{v1,v2},P = {{v1},{v2}} and h : Z → R2 is given by h(z1) = (6,0),h(z2) = (2,1)
and h(z3) = (5,5).
The corresponding extensive form game Γ({N}), where the players cooperate,
is depicted in Figure 2. The game tree is the same but now we have a one-player
game with player N,s oP({N}) = {v1,v2},h
{N}
N (z1) = 6,h
{N}




5We are only interested in subgame perfect equilibria for the family of games in
extensive form {Γ(π)|π ∈ Π(N)}. We will restrict our attentiontoperfect extensive
formgames. WewillcallagameΓ aperfectextensive form gameiftwoconditions
are satisﬁed:
(P.1) (Perfect Information Condition) Γ is a game in extensive form of perfect
information without chance moves;
(P.2) (Genericity Condition)Ine ac hg ameΓ(π) withπ ∈ Π(N) and also in each of
its subgamesthereis a unique subgame perfect equilibrium(SP-equilibrium).
We call property (P.2) the genericity condition because (a) for each game sat-
isfying (P.1) by stochastically perturbing the payoﬀs we get with probability 1 a
game satisfying (P.1) and (P.2); (b) for each game satisfying (P.1) and each  >0
there is a game satisfying (P.1) and (P.2) for which the payoﬀs do not diﬀer with
more than   than the corresponding payoﬀs in the original game.
Remark 1. The extensive form games in Example 2 and Example 3 are perfect
extensive form games.
Now, in a natural credible way we can deﬁne a p.f.f. game  N,V  correspond-
ing to a perfect extensive form game Γ= N,K,P,h : for each partition π ∈ Π(N)
6
Figure 1 : Γ ({{1}, {2}}) Figure 2 : Γ ({{1, 2}})
v 1
v 2
z 3 : (5, 5)
z 1 : (6,0)





z 3 : 10
z 1 : 6
z 2 : 3
N
Nand S ∈ πwedeﬁne V(S |π) as the payoﬀtothe (collective) player S inthe unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ(π).
Remark 2. The p.f.f. game  N,V  corresponding to the perfect extensive form
game in Example 2 is the game described in Example 1. See also the p.f.f. game
 N,V  ontained fromthe perfect extensive form gamein Example 3.
The p.f.f. games corresponding to perfect extensive form games have a spe-
cial superadditivity property for root-connected coalitions, which is described in
Theorem 2. Here a coalition S of players is called a root-connected coalition if
for each player i ∈ S and each v ∈ Pi, the path [0,v]f r o mo ri g i nt ov contains only
vertices in XS = ∪j∈SXj.N o t et h a tN is always a root-connected coalition. In Ex-
ample 3 the root-connected coalitions are {1},{1,2} and {1,2,3}, but the coalition
S = {1,3} is not root-connected.
Theorem 2. Let  N,V  be the p.f.f. game corresponding to a perfect game in
extensive form  N,K,P,h .L e t S∈ 2N\{∅} be a root-connected coalition and
let π be a partition of N with S ∈ π.L e t T 1,T2,...,Tm be a partition of S and






Proof. Note that the root0 ∈ XS.L e t[ v0,v1,v2,...,vt] be the path in the tree cor-
respondingtothe unique SP-equilibriumof Γ(π ). Since S is root-connected,there
is an i ∈{ 0,...,t − 1} such that 0 = v0,v1,...,vi ∈ XS and vi+1,vi+2,...,vt  XS.
This implies that by choosing suitable actions in the decision points v0,v1,...,vi
the coalition S can assure the same path resulting in a total payoﬀ for S of  m
r=1 V(Tr |π ). If this path is not optimal for S given π,
then V(S |π) ≥
 m
r=1 V(Tr |π ). 
7Example 3. Consider the perfect extensive form game depicted in Figure 3 with
player set N = {1,2,3}.
The corresponding p.f.f. game  N,V  is described by
V({1}|{{1},{2},{3}}) = 6, V({2}|{{1},{2},{3}}) = 10,
V({3}|{{1},{2},{3}}) = 11, V({1,2}|{{1,2},{3}}) = 16,
V({3}|{{1,2},{3}}) = 11, V({1,3}|{{1,3},{2}}) = 10,
V({2}|{{1,3},{2}}) = 6, V({1}|{{1},{2,3}}) = 6,
V({2,3}|{{1},{2,3}}) = 21, V(N |{N}) = 34.
Notethat (seeTheorem 2)




but for the non root-connected coalition {1,3} we have
V({1,3}|{{1,3},{2}}) = 10 < 6 + 11
= V({1}|{{1},{2},{3}}) + V({3}|{{1},{2},{3}}).
Theorem 3. Let  N,V  be the p.f.f. game corresponding to the perfect extensive
form game Γ= N,K,P,h .T h e n N,V  is compromisable.
Proof. Let πd = {{i}|i ∈ N} be the discrete partition of N. From the deﬁnition of
 i,  N\{i},ui we obtain for each i ∈ N






(6, 7, 0) (6, 10, 11)
(20, 4, 10)
Figure 3 (2) ui ≥ V(N |{N}) −
 
j∈N\{i} V({j}|πd).
Since N is a root-connected coalition by Theorem 2 we have
(3) V(N |{N}) ≥
 
j∈N V({j}|πd).
To prove that ui ≥  i for each i ∈ N note that applying (2), (3) and (1)





d) ≥  i.
That
 







d) ≤ v(N |{N}).
Finally
 
























by applying (2) in the ﬁrst inequality, and (3) in the second inequality. Hence
 N,V  is compromisable. 
Example 4. Consider the compromisable game  N,V  in Example 3. Then   =
(6,6,11),u = (13,24,18) and ψ(N,V) = (8.40625,12.1875,13.40625), where
α = 0.65625.
4 Concluding remarks
Remark 3. In the paper of Tijs (1981) two compromise values were introduced:
(i) the τ-value on the cone of quasi-balanced games
(ii) the σ-value on the larger cone consisting of n-person games with








In this paper we have deﬁned a compromise value on the set CPG
N of compro-
misable n-person p.f.f. games. The next example shows that the set CPG
N is nota
cone.
Example 5. Let N = {1,2,3} and let V and W be deﬁned as following.
V(N |{N}) = 5,W(N |{N}) = 2,andfor i, j,k ∈ N with i  j, j  k,k  i,
V({i}|{{i},{j},{k}}) = 3, V({i}|{{i},{j,k}}) = 0, V({j,k}|{{i},{j,k}}) = 3
W({i}|{{i},{j},{k}}) = 0, W({i}|{{i},{j,k}}) = 1, W({j,k}|{{i},{j,k}}) = 2.
Then  V
i = 0a n duV
i = 5 − min{6,3} = 2,and  W
i = 0a n duW
i = 2 − min{0,2} = 2.
Now for V + W,w eh a v e V+W
i = 1a n duV+W





i = 6 < 7 = V(N |{N}). Thus  N,V + W   CPG
N.
Remark 4. An interesting topic for further research might be the introduction of
other reasonable payoﬀ intervals based on which new compromise values can be
deﬁned for the corresponding compromisable p.f.f.games.
Remark 5. In the paper of Tijs (1981) it is proved that the core of a game is
included in the hypercube [av,bv] determined by the lower vector (minimumright
vector) and the upper vector (marginal contribution vector). For a game  N,V ∈
CPG
N it turns out that the hypercube [ ,u] = {x ∈ RN | i ≤ xi ≤ ui for each i ∈ N}
induced by the reasonable payoﬀ intervals Ii = [ i,ui] for each i ∈ N, contains the
pessimistic core of  N,V  as Theorem 4 shows.
Recall that the pessimistic core of  N,V  is the core C(v) of the pessimistic
TU-game  N,v  obtained from  N,V  by
v(S) = min{V(S |π)|π   S}, S ⊆ N
(see Theorem 3 in Funaki and Yamato (1999)).
Theorem 4. Let  N,V ∈CPG
N and let  N,v  be the corresponding pessimistic
TU-game. Suppose for any π  {N},V (N |{N}) >
 
S∈πV(S |π). Then the hyper-
cube [ ,u] catches the pessimistic core.
10Proof. First we prove that [av,bv] ⊆ [ ,u].
a
v
i = v({i}) = min
π {i}
V({i}|π) =  i;
b
v
i = v(N) − v(N\{i})
= v(N) − min{V(N\{i}|π)|π   N\{i}}
= V(N |{N}) − V(N\{i}|{N\{i},{i}})
≤ V(N |{N}) − min{V(S |π)|π ∈ Π
i(N)} = ui.
Now note that [ ,u] ⊇ C(v) follows from[av,bv] ⊇ C(v) (Tijs (1981)). 
Remark 6. We have shown that for the generic class of perfect games in exten-
sive form the corresponding credible games in p.f.f. based on subgame perfect
equilibria are compromisable. A topic for further research might be the study of
p.f.f. games arising when relaxing the perfectness conditions (P.1) and (P.2) for
games in extensive form.
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